










INITIAL LUCK, STATUS-SEEKING AND SNOWBALLS 








CESIFO WORKING PAPER NO. 1216 
CATEGORY 9: INDUSTRIAL ORGANISATION 
JUNE 2004 
 






An electronic version of the paper may be downloaded  
• from the SSRN website:              www.SSRN.com 




Initial Luck, Status-Seeking and Snowballs Lead to 






Corporate success stories often resemble a snowball. We show how initial luck in hiring 
talented people, the resulting technological advantage, superior corporate culture, and status-
seeking by workers and by consumers can make small initial differences generate large 
differences over time. 
Keywords: industry equilibrium, initial luck, status effects, snowball. 






Department of Economics  
University of California – Irvine 




Department of Economics 
P.O.Box 54 





Centre for Economic and Business Research 







An earlier draft of this paper was presented at the CESifo Area Conference on Industrial 
Organization, Munich, March 12-13, 2004. The authors are indebted to Kai Konrad, Vivek 
Ghosal and other participants for helpful comments. 1I n t r o d u c t i o n
The late 1990s were revolutionary in many markets for high-technology prod-
ucts. Companies were created from scratch, with some dramatic successes and
failures. In the market for mobile phones, several producers invested heavily in
R&D programs to capture the network eﬀects among consumers. But by 2001
only one ﬁrm, Nokia, was proﬁtable, with 50% annual growth in some years;
its market share reached 39% by 2003. All its competitors, including the well-
established Ericsson and Motorola suﬀered large losses. Thus, corporate success
stories often resemble a snowball. Small initial diﬀerences may lead ﬁrms which
produce similar products to end in far diﬀerent situations. The competition is
directed both to the development of new technologies and to the development
of products with new features within an existing technology. The span of about
15 years saw four major technologies, NMT,GSM,21
2G, and 3G. Innovation
was also present within one technology; for example, in 2004 Nokia planned to
deliver 40 new varieties of mobile phones using the 21
2G technology. But no
ﬁrm is guaranteed success. In early 2004 Nokia was losing market share to Sony
Ericsson, Siemens, and Samsung.
Among the other examples of a snowball phenomenon is the contest between
VHS and Betamax standards for video tapes, with only VHS surviving. The idea
that small initial diﬀerences can result in vastly diﬀering equilibria is prominent
in chaos theory and in macroeconomic models with unstable paths. We show
similar outcomes can characterize an industry.
One of the ﬁrms may have gained a competitive advantage through luck.
For example, it may have been luckier than its competitors in hiring workers
who are more talented or better able to work with each other. This could lead
to lower costs, or to products which better satisfy consumer desires. If many
consumers attach status value to buying the better product, the initially lucky
ﬁrm may enjoy much higher proﬁts than its competitors. This can generate
dynamic repercussions, with the the success of a ﬁrm in one period increasing
its chances of success in later periods.
Several mechanisms can generate such a snowball eﬀect. For concreteness
and for analytical convenience we shall concentrate on two mechanisms. First,
we suppose workers gain status from working at a successful ﬁrm, allowing
the ﬁrm to attract better workers at lower pay. Second, we suppose that higher
quality of workers generates a superior corporate culture, which improves future
performance.
Status. People who care what others think of them may view owning a high-
quality product, or working for a ﬁrm which has a good reputation, as increas-
ing their esteem. The phenomenon is well known at universities–faculty are
attracted to Harvard for its prestige, not only for the salaries or environment
it oﬀers. Law school graduates evaluate each other by the prestige of the law
ﬁrms which oﬀered them jobs, or the prestige of the judge who oﬀered them
clerkships. In contrast, working in a prison or in garbage collection oﬀers little
prestige, even if the wage is higher than alternatives the workers might ﬁnd.
2Corporate Culture. T h ec o r p o r a t ec u l t u r ea taﬁrm may reﬂect the identity
of its workers in the past: the higher the quality of workers in the past, the
better its procedures and traditions, and so the more successful it will be in
the future.1 We may also think of current workers hiring new workers, with
high-quality workers better able to identify the quality of job applicants. Here
again, the past quality of workers at a ﬁrm will aﬀect proﬁts in later periods.
Moreover, if capital markets are imperfect, a ﬁrm that was successful in the past
may have suﬃcient assets to survive periods of low proﬁts, and may therefore
be less likely to ﬁre its workers. The increased job security can allow the ﬁrm
to pay lower wages in the future. At a more psychological level, success can
increase the morale and enthusiasm of workers, making them more productive
the greater their success has been in the past.
Path dependence. This paper explores the implications of status concerns
and corporate culture. A ﬁrm which is lucky enough to hire high-quality work-
ers better succeeds in developing technology. This may later beneﬁtt h eﬁrm
in various ways. The ﬁrm may enjoy lower costs, or higher productivity from
a better corporate culture. Such path dependence may explain the evolution of
ﬁrms within some industries. Thus, the diﬀerent fortunes of Nokia and Ericsson
may have arisen from small initial diﬀerences in the quality of their workers,
reﬂected in small diﬀerences in the products. (Casual observation suggests that
Nokia’s phones were more elegant than Ericsson’s, and had longer-lasting bat-
teries). The puzzle is that Nokia increased its dominance under several major
technological changes, where its previous technological lead appeared to have
little relevance to the new technologies. And we nevertheless wish to allow the
dominant ﬁrm to falter, as Nokia did in 2003-2004 when it saw its market share
decline.
2L i t e r a t u r e
Our assumption that people care about status, rather than exclusively about
absolute income, is commonly found in the literature. Rae (1834) and Mill
(1847) consider such a motive. The behavior of consumers who signal income
is studied by many economists since then, most elegantly in the work of Frank
(1984a, 1984b, 1985a, 1985b). Frank also considers workers who care about
their prestige within a ﬁrm, so that a person at the bottom of the wage scale
demands a premium to work with richer people, and a person at the top of
the scale is willing to trade oﬀ income for status. Our analysis complements
1If corporate culture is embodied in the ﬁrm’s workers (as Jovanovic (1979), Prescott and
Visscher (1980), and Becker (1993) suppose), then as Arrow (1974) shows, a ﬁrm’s culture
c a nb ep a t hd e p e n d e n t ,a n dc u l t u r ec a nv a r ya c r o s sﬁrms. The path dependence can be
stronger if management selects workers whose preferences it prefers (Lazear (1995)), or if a
worker prefers to work at a ﬁrm which has a culture ﬁtting his background. This preference
resembles the peer-group eﬀect in schooling, which has been much studied by Epple and
Romano (1998). Becker examines discrimination when workers care who their co-workers are.
Ma (2001) models the peer-group eﬀe c ta tt h ew o r k p l a c e .
3Frank’s by considering status of a worker as viewed by persons outside the ﬁrm,
rather than by co-workers. In small cities, or in cities with a dominant employer,
relative status within a ﬁrm may be most important. In large cities with many
employers, status as observed by people outside the ﬁr mm a yb em o r ei m p o r t a n t .
The status-eﬀect we model diﬀers from the analysis in Fershtman, Weiss and
Hvide (2001), who consider self-esteem which rises with a worker’s wage. We
see a successful ﬁrm as preferring to hire workers with low self-esteem, but who
desire approval from others because they work at a successful ﬁrm.
Studies of discrimination in the labor market use related ideas. In his classic
book, Becker (1957) explores a model where some individuals in a group prefer to
work with persons of the same group. Under factor price equalization this leads
to segregation in diﬀerent sectors. Borjas (1982) assumes that white constituents
prefer to be served by white clerks in a government agency, and that blacks prefer
to be served by blacks. Arrow (1972) supposes that some whites do not like to
work with blacks.
The idea that a person’s utility varies with the types of persons belonging
to the same organization is found in some analyses of clubs. Scotchmer (1992)
proves the existence of a unique competitive equilibrium, which is also Pareto
optimal. Berglas (1976), Brueckner (1991), and McGuire (1991) study the char-
acteristics of a competitive equilibrium when ﬁrms hire workers with diﬀerent
skills. Some attention has also been paid to schooling where the presence of
able students improves the performance of less able students (see Arnott and
Rowse (1987) and De Bartolome (1990)).
3 Assumptions
There are two ﬁrms.2 Each hires workers to develop new technologies and
produce goods with new features. We start with investment in a single period,
each ﬁrm working on a new technology. We then consider ﬁrms which compete
in producing additional features within the available technology. Lastly, we
consider the fully dynamic problem where ﬁrms compete in developing new
technologies over an inﬁnite horizon.
Initial luck in R&D. At the beginning of the period, the two ﬁrms (A and
B) are identical. Each is uncertain about what product features consumers will
value. Workers develop a product, with features consumers value at fi for ﬁrm
i’s product. The features may include ease of operating the product, weight,
color, shape, and so on. The outcome of a ﬁrm’s investment, which we do not
model, is random. After the investments are made, nature makes a draw to
determine the relative merits of the outcomes, say fA − fB = δ.O n eﬁrm, say
A, has a better product than the other; δ is then positive. Features fA and
fB can be interpreted as the distance to hidden consumer tastes. A natural
interpretation for the diﬀerence in the outcomes is that some ﬁrm is lucky in
2The number of ﬁrms is ﬁxed because ability to innovate is a scarce resource.
4hiring workers who better know consumer preferences than do workers in the
other ﬁrm.
Consumers: product features and status. In the basic model, the con-
sumers decide once what to buy. Consumers are willing to pay more for the
better product, with the premium δ = fA − fB ≥ 0. Furthermore, consumers
value status: a consumer is willing to pay more for the better product, regard-
less of its absolute quality. This status concern may arise, for example, from
the satisfaction of having early identiﬁed which product is better or from the
information role of the having the product. We index consumers according to
the value they place on status, with consumer i placing a value si on status.3
If the two products are of the same quality, status considerations are irrelevant.
The mass of consumers is 1,a n dsi is uniformly distributed between zero and
one.
We suppose that the better product gives a ﬁxed status eﬀect of s, regard-
less of the diﬀerence in quality between the two products. We view this as a
simplifying assumption. Suppose s is an increasing, concave, function of δ.I f
the slope of this function becomes close to zero for all but small values of δ,
then we can take status to be s for the better product throughout almost the
whole range of δ.
The price of good i is pi. For any given values of pA, pB (with pA >p B), fA,
and fB, there exists a critical value of willingness to pay for status, b s,s u c ht h a t
consumers with a higher value buy good A, and others buy good B.I fb s ∈ (0,1)
sales at both ﬁrms are positive, and the following indiﬀerence condition for the
marginal consumer is satisﬁed:
fA + b s − pA = fB − pB. (1)
Consumers with s<b s buy product B; the others buy product A.T h es h a r e
of consumers buying product B is
b s = fB − fA + pA − pB. (2)
4 Market equilibrium
To reﬂect the importance of ﬁxed costs of R&D, we assume that the marginal
cost of production is zero. The two ﬁrms engage in Bertrand competition. Firm
A’s objective is to
max
pA
(1 − fB + fA − pA + pB)pA, (3)
resulting in
pA =
1+pB − fB + fA
2
. (4)
3As an example, grandmothers seldom regard a portable phone as a status symbol.
Teenagers do.
5Firm B’s objective is to
max
pB
(fB − fA + pA − pB)pB, (5)
resulting in
pB =
pA + fB − fA
2
. (6)
Equations (4) and (6) imply that the prices are
pA =








For ﬁrm B to charge a non-negative price, we must have fA − fB < 1.T h e





We see that the market share of ﬁrm B cannot exceed 1/3. Status considerations
make the upper limit bind. The proﬁts of the two ﬁrms are
ΠA =
µ










Since fA >f B, ΠA must be greater than ΠB.
To see how status considerations aﬀect the equilibrium prices, consider the
equilibrium when status is irrelevant, that is were s =0for all consumers.
Each consumer is indiﬀerent between the products if the diﬀerence in quality is
compensated by prices,
pA − pB = fA − fB.
Any one ﬁrm can capture the whole market by undercutting the price of the
competitor. In equilibrium, pB =0 , and ﬁrm A can capture the whole market
by charging pA = fA − fB > 0, which then also is its proﬁt.
Suppose that the beter product now generates status. As ﬁrm A can keep the
whole market by choosing the price as without status eﬀects, namely fA − fB,
its proﬁts cannot be reduced. It can, however, raise its price at the cost of losing
those customers who value status less than b s and who switch to ﬁrm B. Firm A
will ﬁnd it proﬁtable to raise the price above fA − fB + pB if
µ
2+( fA − fB)2
3
¶
>f A − fB. (10)
With fA − fB < 1 this always holds.
6Proposition 1 The product of the lucky ﬁrm better satisﬁes consumer tastes.
The status eﬀect associated with the better product enhances the quality eﬀect,
allowing the ﬁrm with the better product to charge a higher price. Consumers
who little value status buy the cheaper product.
Corollary 2 If consumers value status, the ﬁrm with the better product able to
raise its proﬁts even when the quality diﬀerence is small.
Corollary 3 With small initial diﬀerences in product quality, the ﬁrm with
the better product ﬁnds it proﬁtable to attract only consumers who highly value
status, thus leaving some market share for the losing ﬁrm.
Do consumers who place little value on status gain or lose from the existence
of some consumers who highly value status? If both ﬁrms are active, the price of
the inferior good (bought by consumers who little value status) is pB =
1+fB−fA
3 ;
a buyer of this good enjoys a consumer surplus of fB −pB =
2fB+fA−1
3 .I fﬁrm
A chooses to set a price so that all consumers buy its good, it sells the good at
price fA − fB; a buyer’s consumer surplus is fA − pA = fB. So the consumer
surplus of a person who little values status is larger when both goods are sold
if
2fB+fA−1
3 >f B,o ri ffA − fB > 1, which can never hold.
Lemma 4 The presence of consumers who highly value status can hurt con-
s u m e r sw h od on o t .
Recalling the results from above, we also conclude.
Proposition 5 The ﬁrm that developed a better product always has a larger
market share than the other ﬁrm.
4.1 A snowball
To allow for a snowball, that is for initial success to lead to later success, we
consider investment in multiple periods. We do so ﬁrst with a two-period model.
We provide two mechanisms which independently can explain a snowball eﬀect.
We notice, however, that they may also be mutually reinforcing.
In period 1, as in the previous section, ﬁrms develop a new product. In
period 2 both ﬁrms engage in development eﬀort, further improving the quality
of their products. A conservative assumption for our purposes is that at the
end of period 1, ﬁrm B can imitate ﬁrm A’s product; therefore the diﬀerences
between the products produced by the two ﬁrms will reﬂect investments made
in period 2.
4.1.1 Status eﬀects among workers
At the end of period 1, each ﬁrm has a product with quality fo
A.C o n s i d e r
competition in period 2.E a c h ﬁrm chooses to invest in developing additional




We now extend the model to allow workers to value status: a person is willing
to work at a lower wage at the ﬁrm which had the better product in period 1.
This diﬀerence can arise if a worker’s utility from employment derives both
from his monetary wage and from the status associated with employment at
his ﬁrm. Working at a ﬁrm known to have high-quality workers could provide
utility for the worker because of self-satisfaction. Or the extra utility could
appear because outsiders use the quality of a person’s employer as a signal of
his quality: outsiders could perceive employment in successful ﬁrm as a signal
indicating that the worker is likely of high quality.
Let the status value of working at the winning ﬁrm be sA, so that if the
wage at ﬁrm B is wB, the wage at ﬁrm A is wA = wB −sA. Normalize the wage
at ﬁrm B to 1, so that wB =1 ,a n d0 <w A =1−sA < 1. Because of the value
a person places on working at the better ﬁrm, wA ≡ θ<1.
Increased eﬀort or increased employment is subject to increasing costs. In
particular, let the cost of developing enhancement e be θe2/2. We simplify
notation by normalizing quality fA =0 .I np e r i o d2 ,ﬁrms play a Cournot game
in their R&D, knowing that they engage in Bertrand competition when setting




















The ﬁrst-order conditions for maximizing proﬁts are




2+2 ( eB − eA)
9
















Since θ<1, it follows that eA >e B: ﬁrm A invests more than ﬁrm B does. We
also note that for both ﬁrms to engage in development, ﬁrm A’s cost advantage
8cannot be too large. Necessary conditions are that θ>2
7 =0 .29 and that
θ> 84
126 =0 .67. As the last inequality is a stronger requirement, it is binding




















Proposition 6 (Snowball eﬀect with status concerns). If workers at the better
ﬁrm enjoy higher status, it can pay a lower wage. This cost advantage enables
it to invest more than the other ﬁrm in developing new models of the product,
and therefore to maintain its lead.
4.1.2 Corporate Culture
A ﬁrm which happened to hire good workers may also develop a better corporate
culture, allowing it to produce better products in the future. In other words,
for any given labor input e allocated to R&D, ﬁrm A’s development eﬀorts are
more eﬀective the better its early hires, and so the better its corporate culture.
The product qualities are then
fA = fo
A + γeA,γ > 1
fB = fo
A + eB.
It is now convenient to interpret γ as a measure of corporate culture, and
ignore here status eﬀects. As consumers are willing to pay a premium for the




















The ﬁrst-order conditions for maximizing proﬁts are










21 − 6γ2,e B =
6 − 4γ2
21 − 6γ2.
Clearly, investment incentives depend on the advantage ﬁrm A enjoys from its
better corporate culture. We have ∂eA/∂γ > 0, and ∂eB/∂γ < 0.The more
eﬃcient ﬁrm invests more in the next round. With γ>1, we have eA >e B .
There is a stronger implication. For ﬁrm B to remain in the market and to
have an incentive to stay in the innovation race, ﬁrm A must not have an
overwhelmingly superior corporate culture. The condition for eB > 0 (and
hence non-zero price) is that γ ≤
q
3
2. If the superior corporate culture at ﬁrm
As a t i s ﬁes γ>
q
3
2, ﬁrm B would be unable to charge a positive price and
so would exit. In the next section, however, we see, that since ﬁrm B has a
chance of developing a superior new technology, it may remain as a potential
competitor.
When both ﬁrms are active in the current race, the condition for pB to be
positive is that γeA −eB =
12γ2−6
21−6γ2 < 1, which amounts to the condition above.
The feasible range for corporate culture which keeps both ﬁrms in the R&D race
is thus 0 <γ<
q
3




We have thus established another snowball eﬀect. From another angle, the
winning ﬁrm pays a lower wage for an eﬃciency unit of labor.
We summarize with
Proposition 7 (Snowball eﬀect with corporate culture). If a ﬁrm’s success is
based on better worker quality, the resulting corporate culture provides another
and independent reason for further success. The better ﬁrm eﬀectively pays a
lower wage in eﬃciency units to its labor. The ﬁrm that initially had a better
product will therefore also have the better product, and higher proﬁts, in the next
period.
5 Large innovations
The previous sections showed how status concerns of workers and a superior
corporate culture of the market leader can generate snowball eﬀects on the
leader’s proﬁts and market share. In those sections investment by a ﬁrm had
a deterministic outcome, and in equilibrium the ﬁrm which initially had the
better product would also have the better product in later periods. We can
interpret this as applying to incremental modiﬁcations of a known technology.
But in developing new technologies (such as in the switch from analog to digital
mobile phones or from the GSM to 3G), the outcomes of investment may be
highly uncertain: a ﬁrm which had the better product under one technology may
invest heavily, and still ﬁnd that the other ﬁrm developed a better technology.
In this section we allow for this possibility.
105.1 Status eﬀects among workers
Consider the industry dynamics starting with a given state, when one of the
ﬁrms, say A, developed the better technology. As before, ﬁrm A can engage in
R&D eﬀo r ta tl o w e rc o s tt h a nc a nﬁrm B. Thus, it is more likely than ﬁrm B to
develop a superior technology. Investment by ﬁrm i is ei. The probability that




+ ε(eA − eB),q B =
1
2
+ ε(eB − eA),ε > 0. (16)
We expect that in equilibrium, eA >e B,t h a ti s ,1
2 + ε(eA − eB) > 1
2 making
1
2 + ε(eB − eA) < 1
2. A success for ﬁrm A means that it earns a higher proﬁt
and continues to have the better product. If ﬁrm B, however, produces a better
technology and hence a better product, the market positions will change. The
technology leader becomes the laggard and the laggard becomes the leader in
the race for the next variety. The game continues indeﬁnitely. In technical
terms, there is a continuous industry dynamics with no stationary state.
To analyze the optimal current R&D, suppose as before that in the current
period ﬁrm A has the better product. The discounted value of proﬁts for ﬁrm i is
Vi;t h ep r o ﬁts in the current period are Πi. As explained in the previous sections,
consumers are willing to pay a premium for the better product, ΠA > ΠB.The
quality and hence this premium increases with the eﬃciency of corporate culture,
γ.
Denote the discount rate by r. Recall that the relative success of the ﬁrms
may change over time. Thus, ΠA is not the proﬁts of a named ﬁrm in each
period, but rather the proﬁts in any period of the ﬁrm which has the better
product. Similarly, VA is the discounted value of proﬁts for the ﬁrm which in
the period under consideration has the better product. Assume both ﬁrms plan
to be active, VA > 0,V B > 0. Then the Bellman equations are




















They capture the idea that the leading ﬁrm experiences a capital loss if it
loses its position, while the lagging ﬁrm experiences a capital gain if catches





(VA − VB) (19)
and
eB = ε(VA − VB). (20)
Then
ε(eA − eB)=ε21 − θ
θ
(VA − VB).
11With θ<1,w em u s th a v eeA >e B: the status eﬀect among workers makes the
ﬁrm that was better in period 1 invest more in R&D than the other ﬁrm.
Inserting (19) and (20) into the Bellman-equations gives
rVA = ΠA +(
1
2
− ε21 − θ
θ





rVB = ΠB +(
1
2
− ε21 − θ
θ






r(VA − VB)=ΠA−ΠB+(2ε21 − θ
θ









∆2 − (1 + r)∆ +( ΠA − ΠB)=0 . (21)
This equation has two roots. Only one can be relevant, as an increase in current




(1 + r)2 − 6ε2 1−θ




For the sake of comparison, suppose for the moment that the more suc-
cessful ﬁrm in an initial period maintains a permanent instead of a temporary
advantage. Then a steady state equilibrium exists with
b ∆ = c VA − c VB =
c ΠA − c ΠB
r
. (23)
With probabilistic success, however, the better ﬁrm in one period must engage
in costly investment to maintain its superior technology, reducing its value and
facing the risk of falling behind. We thus expect that throughout the dynamic
path, t ≥ 1, ∆t < b ∆.




Denoting for a moment x =3 ε2 1−θ















2r +2 x(ΠA − ΠB)+r2 +1
¢





2r − 2x(ΠA − ΠB)+r2 +1
´
− (1 + r).
Then D>0 for a whole range of parameter values. For example, it is likely to
hold at least when r and ΠA − ΠB are not too large. In those circumstances, a
decrease in θ increases ∆; ∂∆/∂θ < 0.
125.2 Corporate Culture
Above we showed how status concerns of workers can generate a snowball eﬀect
when ﬁrms develop a new technology. We consider next the eﬀect of superior
corporate culture, showing that it can also generate snowball eﬀects.




+ ε(γeA − eB),q B =
1
2
+ ε(eB − γeA),ε > 0. (25)
with γ>1 ˙ The Bellman equations are




















The optimal R&D eﬀorts satisfy
eA = γε(VA − VB) (28)
and





(1 + r)2 − 6ε2(γ2 − 1)(ΠA − ΠB)
3ε2(γ2 − 1)
.
Now ∂∆0/∂γ > 0. Superior corporate capital operates in a similar way as
the status eﬀect among workers of the market leader.
We collect the results above
Proposition 8 When the industry dynamics are characterized by probabilistic
success, the ﬁrm with a better product in any period ﬁnds it optimal to invest
more in R&D than does the other ﬁrm. The status eﬀect among its workers
reduces the investment cost and gives an incentive to take advantage of the
resulting snowball eﬀect. A more eﬃcient corporate capital has similar eﬀects.




2, the losing ﬁrm abstains from current development eﬀort
and market activity) means that in the dynamic model of the current section,
ΠB =0 . The current model, however, shows that ﬁrm B may nevertheless
engage in the competition to develop a new technology.
Lastly, we note a possibility for multiple equilibria. Suppose that one ﬁrm
expects the other to develop the better product. This solidiﬁes the winner’s
position, and is self-enforcing. A laggard, however, who expects to win the next
r o u n dw i t hs u ﬃciently high probability, will invest heavily, which makes success
more likely.
136 Final remarks
The model above explained corporate success in terms of initial luck in hiring
talented workers and the subsequent snowball eﬀect, making evolution of an
industry path-dependent. It may also explain some other behavior.
Consider unemployment. The puzzle of unemployment is why people who
are willing to work at the market wage are not employed. One potential answer
would rest on the reputational externality discussed above. A low-quality worker
could increase output, and generate more revenue for ﬁrm than his wage. But if
he is hired, the reputation of workers in the ﬁrm will decline, and other workers
will demand a higher wage. The ﬁrm may therefore not want to hire additional
low-quality workers.
The idea of established corporate culture has another implication worth ex-
ploring. Suppose that workers, after developing valuable skills, exploit their
bargaining power by seeking competing job oﬀers from the rival ﬁrm. The lag-
ging ﬁrm, in particular, might seek to attract high-quality workers from the
competitor. But since working at the laggard ﬁrm confers no favorable status,
it must pay a higher wage. Corporate culture, especially when embedded in
workers, reduces the inter-ﬁrm mobility of workers.
Our model also yields testable implications: 1) The wage distribution diﬀers
from the distribution of productivity. 2) In human-capital intensive industries,
leading ﬁrms pay lower wages for workers of similar talent than do lagging
ﬁrms. 3) In a market with heterogeneous products, price diﬀerences often exceed
diﬀerences in quality. 4) A ﬁrm with a small initial lead may often expand its
lead in later periods. 5) Though technological leadership in an industry tends to
be maintained at the introduction of new technologies, positions of leadership
are lost over time with positive probability.
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